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in said contract." The judgment of the trial court was reversed by the
appellate court which held that the lien that was waived by the contractor
was not revived by the owner's refusal to make instalment payments due
under the contract. Hammond Hotel & Improvement Co. v. Williams et al.,
176 N. E. 154. A petition for rehearing was filed. Held, petition for
rehearing denied. 178 N. E. 177, Appellate Court of Indiana Oct. 30, 1931.
That a contractor may, by express agreement, waive the right of himself and those claiming under him to the mechanic's lien given by the
statute is well settled. Kokomo, Frankfort & Western Traction Co. v.
Kokomo Trust Co. (1923) 193 Ind. 219, 137 N. E. 763; Baldwin Locomotive
Works v. Hines (1919), 189 Ind. 189, 125 N. E. 400, 127 N. E. 275; Hoosier
Brick Co. v. Floyd County Bank (1917) 64 Ind. App. 445, 116 N. E. 87;
Masson v. Indiana Lighting Fixture Co. (1913) 53 Ind. App. 376, 100 N.
E. 875. (For cases from other jurisdictions see note, 1 Ann. Cas. 954.)
But it is essential that the intention to waive the lien should clearly ,appear.
Masson v. Indiana Lighting Fixture Co. supra.
The case of Kertscher v. Green (1912) 205 N. Y. 522, 99 N. E. 146,
Ann. Cas. 1913E, 561, and Greenfield v. Brady (1912) 204 N. Y. 659, 97
N. E. 1105, seem to be the only cases which might be urged against the
rule of the principal case. The Greenfield case was decided and affirmed
without opinion. And upon the authority of that case the New York
Court of Appeals, in the Kertscher case, said, "Assuming that the contract
between the parties is to be construed as contended by the defendant's
(that all liens were waived including the contractor's) their breach of the
contract by their default in making that payment relieved the plaintiff
from the obligation upon its part, and it became entitled to file a lien for
its work and materials." This statement was, however, unnecessary to
the decision and the case could easily have been left to stand upon the
second ground given by the court that the stipulation for the waiver of
the lien, properly construed, did not apply to a lien by the contractor
himself but only to liens by third parties. And ten years later, (1922)
the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Cummings v. Broadway94th St. Realty Co., distinguished the Greenfield case upon its facts and
said that the doctrine of the Kertscher case should not be extended holding,
in substance, that the statement made in that case to the effect that the
failure of the owner to pay the amount due upon the contract revived the
right to the lien once waived was unnecessary and erroneous. In this manner the New York Courts were brought into harmony with the courts
of other jurisdictions upon this point. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Art
Centre Apts. (1931) 253 Mich. 501, 235 N. W. 234; Blakely -v. Moshier,
(1892) 94 Mich. 299, 54 N. W. 54; Au Sable River Broom Co. v. Sanborn,
(1877) 36 Mich. 358; Center Creek Mining Co. v. Coyne, (1912) 164 Mo.
App. 492, 147 S. W. 148; Whitmer v. Arthur, 23 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 481;
Collinsville Mfg. Co. v. Street, (1917) (Tex. Civ. App.) 196 S. W. 284.
S. J. S.
WILLS-COMPETENCY

TO

ATTEST-COMPETENCY OF SPousEs-Testatrix,

Nancy T. Pritchard, executed a will in which her husband was beneficiary
to the amount of $1,000 and also one of the two attesting witnesses. There
were other beneficiaries, some of whom were heirs. The heirs attempt to
have the will set aside because of improper execution in that the husband
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attested the wife's will. Held, that the gift to the husband is void by
statute and he then is competent under the general statutory rule abolishing the incompetency of the husband and wife to testify for anAl against
each other. Pritchard v. Pritchard,177 N. E. 502, Ind. App. (1931).
The statutes on wills require "competent" or "credible" witnesses. It
is uniformly agreed that "competency" or "credibility" is to be determined
by reference to the common law and code rules of evidence. Three principal incompetencies arise here. The first is the one arising out of a legal
interest in the subject matter of the action the witness is called to support; the second is the collateral incompetency of the husband or wife,
that is, if the one is incompetent on the ground of interest the other is
also disqualified; the third is the privilege, as between husband and wife,
against the disclosure of confidential communications. All three situations
turn upon the statute law of Indiana at the present time, and the principal case completes the cycle of judicial interpretation of those statutes,
because it is the first case discussing the third situation.
I. Unless the common law incompetency for interest is removed one
who takes an interest under a will is incompetent to attest that will. Sec.
552 Burns (1926) retains the common law incompetency of interest in an
action affecting the estate of an ancestor which necessarily includes an
action to contest a will. Pfaffenberger v. Pfaffenberger, 189 Ind. 507, 127
N. E. 766; Willey v. Gordon, 181 Ind. 252, 104 N. E. 500. So it is a general
rule, either at common law in some jurisdictions or by statutory enactment in others, that a beneficiary under a will is an incompetent attesting
witness to the will. Wiley v. Gordon, supra; In re Kessler's Estate, 221
Pa. St. 314, 70 A. 770; Hottenstein v. Hottenstein, 191 Ind. 460, 133 N.
E. 489. But if the interest were removed, the witness, who would no
longer be benefited, ought to be competent to prove the will. This end
was obtained in England under the statute of 25 Geo. II, and in Indiana
by section 3472 Burns (1926), both of which make the will void as to a
benefited witness, thus removing the previous disqualifying interest, and
making the witness competent to prove the will as to the other beneficiaries.
Willey v. Gordon, supra; Kaufman v. Murray, 182 Ind. 272, 105 N. E. 466.
The fact then that in the principal case the witness was a beneficiary
did not render him incompetent as to the balance of the will.
II. A more difficult situation, which was not present in the principal
case, arises wherever a wife or husband attests a will under which the
spouse is beneficiary. The cases generally say that the interest of the
wife in the bequest to the husband is contingent, and therefore will not
render the wife incompetent on the ground of interest, since the wife
might predecease the husband, or might be divorced, or the property might
be consumed or taken in execution levied upon the property of the husband.
Evans, The Competency of Testamentary Witnesses, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 250;
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 54 Ia. 443, 6 N. W. 699; Bates v. Officer, 70 Ia. 343,
30 N. W. 608; In re Hatfield, 21 Colo. App. 443, 122 Pac. 63; Davis v.
Davis, 43 W. Va. 300, 27 S.E. 323. In spite of the fact that the wife is
not disqualified on account of interest in the husband's legacy, it is true
that the marital relation to one taking an interest under the will is itself
made the disqualifying feature in some states. Smith v. Jones, 68 Vt. 132,
34 A. 424; Page on Wills, No. 324. So in Indiana "when the husband or
wife is a party to the suit, and incompetent as a witness in his or her own
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behalf, the other is incompetent." 556 Burns (1926). The beneficiary is
a necessary party to the probate proceedings and, in applying this section,
it was held in Belledine v. Golley, 157 Ind. 49, 60 N. E. 706, where the wife
witnessed a will to which there were insufficient competent witnesses and
in which the husband was the sole legatee, that the will failed. The reason
would seem to be that the husband, on account of his interest under the
will, would not be a competent witness in his own behalf to a will under
which he was sole legatee; therefore it follows under section 556 that the
wife would also not be competent. This would disqualify the wife as
witness because of the marital relation and not on account of interest. Sec.
3472 Burns was not discussed in this case. On its face it is not applicable,
for it applies only where the witness is also a beneficiary. But in a later
case the statute was extended to take care of the situation. A wife
attested a will under which the husband was one of numerous beneficiaries
and the Indiana court held that although there exists the observed disability under sections 552 and 556, and the rule in the Belledine case, yet
under the statute which not only avoids the gift to the attesting witness
but also gives the other beneficiaries the right to the incompetent witnesses' testimony in proof of the will, the will is established, but it is
void as to the benefited husband (who, however, is not a witness). 3472
Burns (1926); Kaufman v. Murray, 182 Ind. 372, 105 N. E. 466. See also
Laming v.Gay, 70 Kan. 353, 85 Pac. 407; Hayden v. Hayden, 107 Neb. 806,
186 N. W. 972. The Kaufman case, in commenting upon the Belledine case
and the effect of section 3472, stated: "In the Belledine case it was correctly decided that the wife of the sole beneficiary of a will was not a
competent witness, but it was because 3472 does not apply to such a case,
for by the terms of that section the named beneficiary could not take
under the will (it being made void as to him), and as a result there would
be no person to which the devise or legacy could apply." It has been
urged, however, that where the husband is sole legatee and the wife a
necessary witness, the result of the Belledine case would still follow, for
it makes no difference in result whether we say the will fails because the
witness is incompetent or because the lone beneficiary can not take under
the will. Page on Wills, No. 294. In theory the Belledine and the Kaufman cases seem to be at odds, although the results of both are consistent.
It must, however, be taken to be settled by the Kaufman case that Sec.
3472 Burns operates to deprive the spouse of a witness of any benefit conferred upon the spouse (rather than the witness) by the will, and that
the witness is competent as to the balance of the will.
III. When a witness is spouse of the maker, the common law rule
was, for no good reason at all, that the attesting consort was incompetent,
even when she took no interest under the will. Gump v. Gowans, 226 Ill.
653, 80 N. E. 1086; Page on Wills, No. 324. The chief reasons for not
allowing the husband or wife to attest the will to which the other was a
party were often stated as follows: (1) The unity of husband and wife
is such that to allow it would amount to permitting a person to attest his
own will; (2) the domestic tranquility would be jeopardized by the disclosure of confidential communications. Rood on Wills, Ed. 2, No. 318.
The latter is of course inapplicable in will cases because it refers only
to not allowing the spouses to give testimony "in reference to each other
personally." Evans, The Competency of Testamentary Witnesses, 25 Mich.
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L. Rev. 247. When one spouse attests a will made by the other the attester
would not be a witness for or against the other to establish the will, for
the testator, of necessity, is dead and would not be a party to such a
proceeding; and in view of the fact that the incompetency of the husband
and wife ceased at common law upon the death of either and also that
the oneness of husband and wife is largely dissipated by statute, there
appears no reason for the common law rule. Page on Wills, No. 324. In
connection with the unfounded common law reasons itmust be considered
whether section 552 Burns (1926), which disqualifies a witness taking an
interest under the will, and section 556 Burns (1926), declaring that
"whenever the husband or wife is incompetent as a witness in his or her
own behalf, the other is incompetent," have the effect of making us adopt
the common law rule. At the outset it is hard to conceive of any disqualifying interest which the attesting spouse would take from the will
of the consort; and likewise the relational statute, section 556 Burns (1926)
should not apply to make the attesting spouse incompetent because it is,
by its express wording, applicable only when the husband and wife are
parties; and, as it has been pointed out before, the deceased spouse is
never a party to any proceeding concerning his will. Hence, since there
appears no reason as far as our interest and relational statutes are concerned for not allowing one spouse to attest the consort's will, it then
follows, as it was concluded in the principal case, that the general statute
removing the common law incapacity of witnesses ought to allow it. 549550 Burns (1926).
J.B. E.

